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BULK MISDEMEANOR JUSTICE 
STEPHANOS BIBAS* 
Alexandra Natapoff’s article, Misdemeanors,1 shines a much-needed 
spotlight on the mass production of criminal justice and injustice in 
millions of low-level cases. For many decades, academics have dwelt ad 
nauseam on the biggest, sexiest criminal cases, especially capital and other 
serious felonies such as murder and rape. Courts and commentators have 
spun out elaborate accounts of the precise procedural guarantees that 
should govern adversarial combat between prosecutors and appointed 
defense counsel in these cases.2 But, as I have argued elsewhere, in making 
rules for the small sliver of jury trials, judges and scholars have neglected 
the much larger world of plea bargaining.3 
Natapoff draws on her experience in criminal defense to explore how 
far out of sync the ideal of adversarial due process is from the reality of 
cookie-cutter dispositions. She trenchantly explains how many low-level 
cases depend almost entirely on a police officer’s word, with no 
meaningful prosecutorial screening or defense counsel testing, or even no 
defense counsel at all. And she highlights the costs of this assembly-line 
mechanical justice, not only in terms of wrongful convictions but also 
impacts on the poor, minorities, and public respect for the justice system. 
The prime culprit in Natapoff’s story is the hidden, informal discretion 
that police officers enjoy to arrest, charge, and effect convictions, abetted 
by prosecutors’ and judges’ abdication and defense counsel’s absence or 
impotence. Given the magnitude of the problem, her proposed solutions are 
surprisingly half-hearted, ranging from raising evidentiary standards to 
appointing more and more effective lawyers to reducing punishments. In 
 
 * Professor of Law and Criminology and Director, Supreme Court Clinic, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
 1. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012).  
 2. E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000). 
 3. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty 
Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1148–74 (2001). 
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fairness, I should note that her reform proposals are not the heart of her 
article. But these efforts at doctrinal tinkering, I fear, mask the deeper 
structural problems that demand wholesale reforms. 
Part I of this Response elaborates upon Natapoff’s diagnosis of 
criminal justice’s failings, showing that the problem’s roots go all the way 
down to its professionalization and mechanization. Part II then offers 
tentative thoughts about what systemic change would be needed to pull 
these weeds up by the roots, a worthwhile ideal even though it is unlikely 
to happen any time soon. 
I.  HIDDEN, UNCHECKED DISCRETION AND ARBITRARY 
OUTCOMES 
In places, Natapoff suggests that race and poverty underlie the 
misdemeanor morass.4 Those factors certainly are bound up with why we 
police public disorder and similar quality-of-life offenses in the first place. 
And for decades, many criminal procedure scholars have remained stuck in 
the Warren Court mindset, viewing criminal procedure’s job as combating 
racism among police and prosecutors. But it is fairer to say that poverty and 
race, though important, risk distracting attention from the deeper roots of 
the problem. Not one of the effects that she identifies depends upon 
imputing even a whiff of race or class bias. The shockingly low level of 
due process comes across as either the bureaucratic bungling of an 
overwhelmed machine or a rational, cheap way to stop overt crimes with 
spillover effects in disorderly neighborhoods.5 Certainly, if rich white 
voters routinely had to endure this system, there would be much more 
outcry and pressure to reform. But that is a far cry from saying that the 
system arose because of racism. At most, it is a haphazard effort to use 
social control to stem societal problems of social disorder and decay. These 
are indeed legitimate problems that society must try to manage, and 
minorities and the poor are disproportionately the victims of social disorder 
as well as those accused of it. 
Natapoff is also right to stress that completely hidden, unreviewable 
discretion threatens the rule of law. But the culprit is not discretion per se. 
(Indeed, she is of two minds about discretion, sometimes accusing police 
and prosecutors of not exercising it to decline cases and sometimes fearing 
 
 4. Natapoff, supra note 2, at 1365–72. 
 5. Bill Stuntz developed the latter explanation and critiqued that phenomenon in William J. 
Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998). 
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that exercising it exacerbates race and class effects.6) Some discretion is 
inevitable and indeed healthy, so that actors may tailor necessarily 
overbroad criminal statutes to factual, administrative, and moral guilt. 
More precisely, the problem is one of unchecked, unreviewable, and 
potentially idiosyncratic discretion. If there is a shared, public sense of 
what the rules are in practice and how they are to be enforced, then actors 
are accountable for administering them publicly and consistently. That 
would greatly ameliorate the problems of notice, discrimination, 
arbitrariness, and accountability. 
There are doubtless people caught up in the system who are factually 
innocent, because the system is too stingy and speedy to probe their guilt. 
Though it is impossible to know, however, I am inclined to join Josh 
Bowers in thinking that the bigger problem is not factual but moral 
innocence. Lawyers are not bad at putting cases into particular legal boxes, 
and while police occasionally shade the truth I have a hard time believing 
that amounts to a large percentage of wrongful convictions. The bigger 
problem, as Bowers explains, is that jaded police and prosecutors know and 
care too little about sorting out which defendants deserve punishment from 
those who are technically guilty under overbroad criminal laws but 
normatively innocent.7 In some ways, Natapoff’s focus on factual 
inaccuracy could make matters worse. When police and prosecutors have 
had difficulty proving an element of crime A, they have persuaded 
legislatures to enact new, broader crime B to obviate proof of that element 
and facilitate plea bargains and convictions.8 Thus, legislators could 
respond perversely to new procedural hurdles by broadening liability so 
that everybody is guilty of something! Of course, the Supreme Court 
refuses to limit pretextual stops and arrests, giving police free rein to use 
minor traffic or public-order offenses to arrest at will.9 
Connected to this political dynamic is the mix of cases prosecuted. 
The expanding criminal procedural guarantees of the past half-century may 
have helped to push enforcement away from crimes with identifiable 
victims, which are harder to prove and depend on credibility, toward 
 
 6. See Natapoff, supra note 1, at 1238–30, 1363–65, 
 7. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to 
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1689–92 (2010). 
 8. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519, 
531 (2001). 
 9. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354–55 (2001) (authorizing warrantless arrests for fine-
only misdemeanors); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment requires only proof of objective probable cause, as “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”). 
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public-order offenses, which are easier as police officers suffice as credible 
witnesses. That shift may perversely have made the system less accurate, 
particularly to the extent that police face little meaningful review. Maybe, 
instead of making it harder to prosecute police-witness crimes, we need to 
make it easier to prosecute victim-centric crimes, in part because there is 
less automatic deference to and crediting of their accounts.10 That is not to 
say that victim control is superior to professional control, but the choice is 
not binary. It is to say that having more actors involved leads naturally to 
more checks and balances, while delegating everything to police officers 
undercuts those checks. 
The bigger story here, as I argue in a new book, is the downside of 
professionalization.11 Today, victims, ordinary citizens, and even 
defendants themselves are shut out of the system. Police arrest, effectively 
charge, and stand ready to testify; prosecutors move cases along, often with 
defense counsel’s complicity; and judges rubber-stamp standard bargains. 
Natapoff suggests that adding more and more effective defense counsel 
would help,12 but her own description of their actual performance belies 
that hope. Underfunding is chronic and intractable, and it is politically 
unrealistic to hope for massive budget increases or across-the-board 
decriminalization. Solutions must instead look for ways to simplify the 
system and make it more transparent and accountable, to stop the criminal 
justice machine from running away from us on auto-pilot. 
II.  LESS ADVERSARIAL COMBAT, MORE TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Instead of hoping for an adversarial nirvana with limitless time, 
money, and experienced counsel and support staff, we should make 
criminal justice less reliant on counsel in the first place. Colonial criminal 
justice was simple and commonsensical enough that victims and defendants 
could navigate it pro se. The dominance of lawyers grew hand-in-hand with 
exponentially more complex rules of law, procedure, and evidence.13 Thus, 
half a century ago, Gideon v. Wainwright recognized that, in felony cases, 
 
 10. In that vein, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), by making it harder to base 
prosecutions on victims’ second-hand accounts, may have perversely pushed enforcement towards 
cases relying on police witnesses, who as a formal matter are subject to cross-examination but as a 
practical matter may benefit from too much deference. 
 11. See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012). 
 12. Natapoff, supra note 1, at 1340–43. 
 13. BIBAS, supra note 11, at 1–6, 15–20. 
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“lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”14 In felony cases, 
that complexity may be inevitable and to some extent desirable, given the 
elaborate procedures and instructions with which courts have encrusted 
jury trials. But for misdemeanor cases, which usually lack juries, it is still 
possible to step back. Judges could apply the rules of evidence in bench 
trials very loosely or not at all, at least as to pro se litigants. They could 
also employ alternatives to money bail much more freely in misdemeanor 
cases, to keep pretrial detention from coercing pleas by innocent 
defendants. Legislatures could streamline technical elements and defenses 
and phrase them in common-sense terms. They could also relax 
unauthorized practice of law rules, to allow lower-priced paralegals and 
social workers to offer representation. Court clerks could offer instructions 
and advice to pro se litigants, as could internet tutorials and consultations.15 
More fundamentally, we could move away from the adversarial 
system entirely, at least for cases involving no jail time.16 In many 
countries, inquisitorial procedures charge judges with proactively ferreting 
out the truth, instead of leaving the evidence and argument to bubble up 
from adversarial combat. Particularly given the chronic absence or 
ineffectiveness of defense counsel, reducing the need for defense counsel 
seems more feasible than massively increasing the funding and supply of 
lawyers. Needless to say, judges would have to reconceive their roles and 
receive special training. But they could take the testimony of the officer, 
victim, and defendant on the spot or within a few days, instead of letting 
misdemeanants languish in jail for months, saving counties and states a 
great deal of money.17 One might even ban lawyers on both sides, leaving 
prosecution to victims, court clerks, or police officers, to level the playing 
field. Doing so would require teaching judges to view it as their job to 
ferret out exculpatory evidence and probe weaknesses in the evidence 
themselves. Though the shift would be radical, it would be feasible and 
cheaper. 
 
 14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 15. My coauthor and I explore many of these suggestions in the context of civil cases in 
Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to 
Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 987–89, 994 (2012). 
 16. The Supreme Court interprets the Sixth Amendment to require appointed defense counsel 
before any criminal conviction imposes a sentence of imprisonment or even a suspended sentence that 
may result in imprisonment. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658, 674 (2002); Scott v. Illinois, 440 
U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). In addition, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury trial before imposition of 
any sentence exceeding six months’ imprisonment. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). 
 17. See generally MALCOLM M . FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES 
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (paperback ed. 1992). 
BIBA 3.DOC 2/11/2013  11:10 AM 
106         SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW POSTSCRIPT [Vol. 85PS:--- 
The other systemic changes would be to make the entire system more 
transparent and accountable. Natapoff sometimes intimates that we need to 
demand better procedure or evidence in each case.18 But that would be next 
to impossible to police. It would be better to adopt stronger policies to 
safeguard and regulate categories of cases before they even land in court, 
by opening up enforcement and charging policies and discretion, as I 
explain below. Solutions have to involve better input and more oversight, at 
least at the wholesale level, by a greater range of actors. Though it may be 
impractical to ensure full-blown trials in such cases, there might be ways to 
divert enforcement and charging practices away from the most problematic 
kinds of cases. 
For instance, police departments might use administrative rulemaking 
to specify what kinds and durations of loitering in what areas will qualify 
as loitering or disorderly conduct, and prosecutors might experiment with 
doing the same with their charging and plea-bargaining policies for quality-
of-life offenses. Community-policing meetings, or even online input 
aggregated through a wiki site, could drive enforcement away from cases 
that depend exclusively on police witnesses towards those where 
neighborhood watch patrollers or residents had complained. Likewise, 
community prosecution could rank truly victimless cases far lower. Police 
could also experiment with video and audio recording of citizen encounters 
to obviate factual disputes and shading the truth. And more citizen review 
boards could monitor police stops and arrests. Police departments could 
then use pay and promotion incentives to discipline officers with large 
numbers of unjustified stops and arrests and to reward those with justified 
arrests, not just large numbers of them. 
Police and prosecutors could also do a better job of gathering and 
publishing data on their arrests, charges, and convictions for particular 
types of crimes, alongside the costs of prosecuting those crimes. The goal 
would be to get voters and the media to compare the cost of traditional 
prosecution with that of alternatives. In that vein, I think that Natapoff 
appears to lament some enforcement that she should consider praising. As 
Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan have argued, anti-gang injunctions and 
similar proactive, public-order policing measures can substitute for more 
reactive approaches such as waiting until a major drug crime or shooting 
occurs and then reacting to it with overwhelming force and lengthy 
sentences.19 Spending extra dollars on policing is cheaper, less punitive, 
 
 18.  See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 1, at 1372–74.  
 19. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A 
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 197, 213. 
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and often more effective. Thus, while misdemeanor enforcement has its 
cost, the alternatives may be worse. The solution is not to make 
misdemeanor policing too costly, but to bring it out of the shadows and 
subject it to meaningful policies and scrutiny. 
 
